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OHIO

v.
KOVACS,

SUMMARY:

~

~curiam)

~ OK
1.

Timely

Federal/Civil
Whether an injunction requiring the clean-up

of a chemical waste stora e facility was a money judgment outside
the scope of the governmental exemption to the automatic stay
provision of the Bankruptcy Act.
2.

BACKGROUND:

11

u.s.c.

§362(a) (2) provides for an

automatic stay of the enforcement, against a debtor or against
property of the estate in bankruptcy, of a judgment obtained
before the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.

Section

362(b) (5) creates an exception whereby "the enforcement of a
judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or
proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental
unit's police power or regulatory power is not automatically
stayed upon filing of a bankruptcy petition."
3.

FACTS & PROCEEDINGS:

Prior to filing a petition in

bankruptcy, the debtor resp Kovacs had been engaged in the
~business of industrial waste disposal in Ohio.

In 1979, the

state of Ohio sued Kovacs as an individual and an officer of
several businesses for violations of various state environmental
laws.

At that time, Kovacs signed a stipulation and judgment

order prohibiting him from causing further pollution, requiring
him to remove hazardous waste from the premises of his company,
and directing him to pay $75,000 to the Ohio Department of
Natural Resources.

Because Kovacs failed to comply, the state

court appointed a receiver to collect Kovacs' nonexempt assets
and use them to finance the cost of clean-up.

~ Kov~nal

In July 1980,

petition in bankruptcy in United States

Bankruptcy Court (S.D. Ohio).

In an effort to assure the

availability of adequate funds to implement the clean-up order,
Ohio sought a state court hearing on Kovacs' current employment
status and income.

Kovacs thereupon moved the Bankruptcy Court

to enjoin Ohio . from proceeding in state court under the automatic
stay provisions of 11

u.s.c.

§362.

The Bankruptcy Court agreed

and enjoined the state from proceeding in state court "to levy on
post-filing wages of the debtor."

...

The DC affirmed, finding that

the state sought to collect money "just as though it were
enforcing a money judgment."
CA 6

affirmed~

curiam.

It concluded that while §362(b)

clearly permitted governmental units to continue to enforce their
police power through mandatory injunctions despite the filing of
a bankruptcy petition, it denied them the power to collect money
in their enforcement efforts.

Like the two lower courts, CA 6

believed that Ohio had returned to state court in pursuit of what
in essence amounted to a money judgment against Kovacs, which was
properly subject to the automatic stay.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr argues the case presents a question

of "profound importance to the federal, state and local
governments which are attempting to protect citizens from the
dangers presented to their health and safety by illegally
operated chemical waste disposal facilities."

Specifically, petr

argues that the Court of Appeals misapplied the Bankruptcy Act in
wrongfully preventing a state from exercising its police power to
abate a public health hazard.

Legislative history of the

Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 indicates that Congress was
concerned that bankruptcy courts not use their authority to
disrupt the enforcement of statutes adopted pursuant to the
states' police power to protect public health and safety.
Accordingly, §362(b) (5), the governmental exemption to the
automatic stay provisions, was drafted.

Unfortunately, the lower

courts have disagreed as to when the statutory stay is applicable
against state police power actions.

See Petn, p. 10-11.

Petr

alleges a conflict with National Labor Relations Board v. Evans

Plumbing Co., 639 F.2d 291, 293 (CA 5 1981) (statutory stay does
not apply against NLRB proceedings):

and~

v. First Financial

Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429 (CA 5 1981) (holding automatic stay
does not apply against an injunction and order appointing a
receiver in a federal police power enforcement action).

The

Fifth Circuit's decision makes clear that the use of
receiverships was a mechanism for implementing injunctive relief
and should not be considered a money judgment.

CA 6 has cut

against Congress' intent that the automatic stay not apply in
these circumstances.
The Solicitor General has filed an amicus brief in support
of petr. 1 The SG argues that the meaning of money judgment for
purposes of S362(b) (5) does not extend to injunctions which
entail the expenditure of money for their performance.
~-

In such

cases, the government's foremost aim is to protect the public
health, not to enhance the public fisc. 2

Pennsylvania and 14

other states have also filed an amicus brief urging a grant.
They note that the decision below has already been cited by other
courts in blocking state police power efforts.

See In re Penn

Terra, Ltd., No. 82-845 (W.D. Pa., Nov. 4, 1982): United States
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 81-2990 (D. N.H., Nov. 15,
1The interest of the United States is that the decision
below may be used to cripple its own environmental enforcement
efforts under a number of federal laws.
2The state and the United States recognize that the
$75,000 payment provided for in the judgment order is a money
judgment subject to the automatic stay provisions.

1982).

Moreover, the decision below cuts against the Tenth

Amendment, 11

u.s.c.

§543(c) (1), which

obli~ates

a bankruptcy

court to protect Ohio from the receiver's inability to carry out
his obligations, and 28

u.s.c.

§959(b), which provides that a

receiver shall manage property in his possession according to
requirements of valid state laws.

Amicus also argue that the

decision below was an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power
by non-Art. III judges.

Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.

Marathon Pipeline Co., 103 S.Ct. 199 (1982).
Resp argues first that the case is moot because on September
17, 1982 the DC entered its decision affirming the Bankruptcy
Court's determinatation that resp's obligations under the
injunction were dischargable in bankruptcy.

Consequently, petr

would be unable to seek to collect the post-petition personal
earnings of the debtor even if the decision of CA 6 on the
automatic stay were reversed by this Court.

On the merits, resp

argues that this case is of limited importance because it does
not involve a corporate debtor or business reorganization under
Chapters 11 or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, but rather involves a
Chapter 7 proceeding for an individual debtor.

Moreover, it does

not involve that portion of the stipulation in judgment entry
requiring resp to stop polluting.
cases cited by petr.

Resp then seeks to distinguish

In NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Co., supra, the

Court noted that "should it be necessary to enforce the judgment
for backpay, a different question would be presented.

We express

no opinion as to whether an action to execute or enforce a money
judgment would be exempt from the automatic stay."

639 F.2d, at

293.

SEC v. First Financial Group of Texas, supra, did not

require payment of moneys by the debtor and ,only allowed the
government agency to implement injunctive relief by preventing
future violations of the law through the appointment of a
receiver.

Resp contends that CA 6 correctly found that the state

court order appointing the receiver could not be distinguished in
substance from a money judgment because of its requirement that
the receiver obtain all nonexempt assets of the debtor as well as
any sums of money which would become payable to the debtor in the
future.

The state fails to accept that a court order may be both

an injunction and a money judgment.
Resp also suggests that Congress, in reshaping the
Bankruptcy Act to compl!Y with Northern Pipeline, may change
substantive provisions, such as the automatic stay sections.
4.

DISCUSSION:

(1)

Mootness.

If resp is correct that the

case is moot, then the decision below should be vacated so that
.

.

it will not carry any precedential effect.
Muns ingwe ar, Inc. , 340 U·.S. 36 (19 50) •

United States v.

This rna tte r might,

however, fall under the "capable of repetition, yet evading
review" exception.

Unless petr responds to the mootness

suggestion in a reply brief, I recommend calling for such a
response.
(2)

On the merits,
the issue of whether an injunction which
,---requires seizure of a debtor's funds is a money judgment for
purposes of the automatic stay provi ~s of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act is certworthy.

Although resp is fairly persuasive in

distinguishing the allegedly conflicting CA 5 decisions, the

~

decision below has already been relied upon in several courts to
block similar exercises of police power.

Because it is not clear

that Congress intended the automatic stay provision to apply in
these circumstances, and because of the important interests of
both the United States and a number of states in the matter, if
the case is not moot, I would recommend a grant.3
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I suggest calling for a response from

petr on the question of mootness.
There is a response and two amicus briefs.
December 21, 1982

Singer

Opinion in Petition

ME

I

3The Art. III problem concerning the bankruptcy courts
should not in any way affect this case, given that Northern
Pipeline is limited to purely prospective effect, and because,
contrary to resp' s suggestion, there is no reason to believe that
Congress will in response to that decision change the automatic
stay provisions.

Court ................... .

l•oted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued .................. . , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced .............. .. , 19 .. .

No.

82-815

OHIO

vs.

KOVACS

HOLD

FOR

CERT.
G

Burger, Ch. J. . . . . . . . . . . . ... .
Brennan, J ................... .
White, J ..................... .

-./

D

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT
N

POST

DIS

AFF

REV

AFF

MOTION
G

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

D

.'-!. .................... .

···
c;. ix · r<. ··· ~ ··· ;_ ·~ ·~wvP' ··················
...............~ ........ ~ .v: .... ···························

Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .
Blackmun, J ................. .

"

Powell, J .................... .
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stevens,

MERITS

/ .
J ...........................

.t! . . . . . . . . ..... .

O'Connor, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1 • ..•••..•••

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

o/-, ~~

~~

February 17, 1984, Conference
List 5, Sheet 3

~

No. 83-1020-CFX
OHIO

Cert to CA6 (Kennedy, Wellford,
McRae [DJ])

v.
~~~
KOVACS (bperator of
waste ilaump)

1.

SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

Petrs challenge the decision of the courts

below that certain liabilities of resp under a state-court
injunction were dischargeable in bankruptcy.
2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

Resp Kovacs had been

engaged in the business of industrial waste disposal in Ohio.

In

-

~

-

1979, the State of Ohio sued Kovacs as an individual and as the
officer of several business entities, including the Chem-Dyne
Corp., for alleged violations of various state environmental laws.
a stipulation and consented to entry of an order
prohibiting him from causing further pollution, requiring him to
remove all hazardous wastes from the premises of the Chem-Dyne
Corp. by July 1980, and directing him to pay $75,000 to the Ohio
of Natural Resources.

When resp failed to comply, the state

court appointed a receiver to collect resp's nonexempt assets and
use them to finance the cost of cleanup at the Chem-Dyne site.
Subsequently, in July 1980, resp filed a Chapter 11 petition
for personal bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of Ohio.
1499.

In re Kovacs, Bankr. No. B-1-80-

By order of the Bankruptcy Court, the proceedings were

converted to Chapter 7 proceedings in September 1980.

In an

effort to ensure the availability of adequate funds to implement
the cleanup order, Ohio sought a state court hearing on resp's
current employment status and income.

Resp moved in Bankruptcy

Court to enjoin Ohio from proceeding in state court, arguing tht
the State's goal was to obtain an order permitting the state-court
receiver to use his post-bankruptcy income to satisfy the unfilled
obligation to clean up the Chem-Dyne site and that such an order
would violate the automatic stay provision of 11

u.s.c.

§362.

The

Bankruptcy Court granted the injunction .
On appeal, both
concluded that, while

.

I~

th~

~

DC and the CA6 affirmed.

The CA6

§362(b) clearly permitted governmental

units to continue to enforce their police power through mandatory

~

- ---

injunctions despite the filing of a bankruptcy petition, it denied
them the power to collect money in their ~nforcement efforts. 1
The CA6 also found that Ohio was pursuing in state court what "in
essence" amounted to a money judgment against resp.

--------------------------

Thus, the

State's action was properly subject to the automatic stay.
Subsequently, bhio petitioned this Court for cert. 2 In
response to that petition, resp argued that the stay appeal was
moot because the DC had recently affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's
determination that resp's obligation to comply with the injunction
was dischargeable in bankruptcy.

Assuming resp's liability under

~

the state-court injunction was dischargeable, petr would be unable
to seek to collect the post-petition personal earnings of resp

even if the decision of the CA6 with respect to the stay was
reversed.

In reply, Ohio argued that its petition was not moot

because the bankruptcy Court's determination of dischargeability
was erroneous and could be reversed on the appeal of that decision
then pending before the CA6.

This Court granted Ohio's petition

for cert, vacated the judgment of the CA6, and remanded the case

-

----

---;====.======:::::=-.

--

to the CA6 for consideration of the question of mootness 'n light
'-----

of the pending dischargeability appea1. 3

·-

Upon considering the

1 11 U.S.C. §362(b) (5) provides that "the enforcement of a
judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action
proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental
unit's police power or regulatory power is not automatically
stayed upon filing of a bankruptcy petition."
2rn its cert petition, the State conceded that the $75,000
payment provided for in the state-court judgment order was a
money judgment subject to the automatic stay provisions.
Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages.

dischargeability appeal, the CA6 affirmed the DC and Bankruptcy
~-

---.

Court's determinations of dischargeability~ expressly relying on
its holding in Kovacs I that "injunctions which require the
performance of acts which necessitate the expenditure of money are
really money judgments."
In the present cert petition, Ohio challenges the judgment of
the CAG with respect to the dischargeability appeal.

The CA6's

consideration of the mootness issue remains pending before it.

It

is petr's assumption that the CA6 is awaiting the Court's action
on this cert petition before determining whether its
dischargeability decision makes Kovacs I moot.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr

(and~

as amicus curiae) : 4

The CAG

decision effectively releases resp from a mandatory injunction
designed to protect public health and safety.

In both Kovacs I

and this case, the CA6 eviscerated the difference between a
dischargeable right to payment for a breach of performance and a
"-------------.........__.,._
nondischargeable right to enforce an injunction that entails the
expenditure of money.

The consequence is that a pre-existing

obligation to clean up a hazardous waste disposal site has been
wholly excused.

This result encourages polluters to abuse the

Bankruptcy Code and defy state and federal environmental
protection laws.

Because of the great number of dumpsites

3The action concerning the stay issued by the Bankruptcy
Court is hereafter
to as Kovacs I.
4A group f 30 States have also filed an amicus brief in
support of petr.

·"

·.

urgently requiring cleanup and the limited funds available to
'

state and federal governments for the purpose, any rule that
excuses the responsible polluter from performing cleanup work has
grave consequences.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, only two classes of claims are
dischargeable in bankruptcy:

(1) any right to payment; and (2) a

right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such
breach itself gives rise to a right to payment.
§101(4).

11

u.s.c.

Thus, a mandatory injunction will only be dischargeable

if the breach may be remedied either by an injunction or by a
right to payment.

Such is not the case here, for, as the DC

acknowledged, the Ohio statutes that authorized the state court to
order resp to remove and dispose of the industrial and hazardous
wastes did not provide the State with an alternative right to
money payment.

The CA6 made no contrary finding, but suggested

that the State may pursue other remedies against resp, such as
penalties and criminal sanctions.
, •'

Penalties and sanctions are not

alternative remedies, but are enforcement mechanisms.
The CA6 vastly oversimplified the situation here and took the
view that if the injunction entails the expenditure of money, then
it must be a right to payment, which is a dischargeable claim.
When the thrust of the government's action is not to collect money
damages from the debtor but rather to protect the public health
and safety, then the government does not stand in the shoes of an
ordinary creditor and the bankrupt's obligation to comply with an
order requiring him to abate health and environmental dangers may
not be voided in bankruptcy.

Many environmental injunctions

-

b

-

entail the expenditure of money for their performance.

A

defendant may be ordered to fund a study to determine the extent
of the threat posed by its waste disposal practices, to remove
leaking drums of toxic wastes that threaten to contaminate
groundwater, or to remove industrial wastes previously deposited
in navigable waters.

In each case, when the government seeks to

enforce the order, its aim is to protect the public health, not to
enhance the public fisc.
Here, the state court's orders were preventive, not
compensatory.

Initially, resp was ordered to clean the dumpsite.

Only when there was a showing that resp had not complied did the
court order resp to release certain assets and future earnings to
the court-appointed receiver.

Although the order directed the

payment of money by resp to the receiver, the receivership was
established for the limited purpose of implementing the cleanup
order.

Accordingly, the order must be distinguished from a

traditional money judgment.
The present decision expressly builds on Kovacs I.
Therefore, it is relevant to note that the CA6 decision in Kovacs

l

is at odds with the approach followed by other courts in

deciding whether governmental enforcement actions fall within an
exemption to the automatic bankruptcy stay.
Plumbing Co., 639 F.2d 291, 293 (CAS 1981)

/\ Jr

(reinstatement order

exempt from bankruptcy stay even though tantamount to an order to

~~~~egin

Lr~

See NLRB v. Evans

paying wages); Commonwealth v. Peggs Run Coal Co., 55 Pa.

Commw. 312, 423 A.2d 765 (1980)

(action brought by state seeking

mandatory injunction ordering compliance with environmental

statutes and posting of bond to ensure compliance not attempt to
enforce money judgment and thus exempt from automatic bankruptcy
stay).

The CA6's decision in the present case cannot be

reconciled with the decisions of several other courts that have
consistently held that a bankrupt defendant's obligation to pay
criminal restitution -- whether ordered by another court before or
after the petition in bankruptcy-- survives discharge.

E.g.,

United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d 216 (CAS 1982); In re Newton, 15
Bankr. 708 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981).

-

The rationale in these cases

focuses on the fact that the government's action is undertaken in
the public interest -- whether it be to protect the public by
'

deterring criminal conduct or to rehabilitate criminal offenders
-- not on the fact that the resulting order requires a bankrupt to
The same analysis should have been applied in the
present case, for the government's action was undertaken in the
public interest to protect public health and safety.

x\

~~

Resp:

Resp contends that the cleanup of the waste dump

ordered by the state court was completed as of December 22, 1983,
three days after the cert petition was filed in this case.

Resp

has attached to his response an affidavit from Kenneth E.
Zimmerman, Resident Engineer, United States Army Corps of
Engineers, supporting his contention that the cleanup is complete.
The State phrased the issue in this case as whether "the
obligation to comply with the injunctions imposed upon Debtor
Kovacs by the Butler County Court of Common Pleas to cleanup the
Chem-Dyne waste storage site" is dischargeable.

The debtor's

obligation under the state court order was to assist the receiver

in the cleanup of the Chem-Dyne facilities.

Inasmuch as the

cleanup has been completed, so that all obligations of the debtor
pursuant to the state court order have been satisfied, the State
of Ohio would be unable to pursue any remedies against resp in the
event that this Court were to overrule the decision of the CA6 and
hold that the debtor's obligations under the state court decision
were nondischargeable.

Therefore, the case is moot.

There is

nothing in the record to suggest that the underlying issue here is
"capable of repetition, yet evading review."

Because the case has

become moot, it should be remanded to the CA6 with directions to
vacate the judgments of the DC and the Bankruptcy Court and to
remand the case for dismissal.
Nelson, 442

See Great Western Sugar Co. v.

u.s. 92 (1979).

If the case is not moot, cert should be denied because it
does not present an important question of federal law and there is
no conflict among the circuits.

The case does not involve any

question pertaining to the ability of the federal, state, and/or
local governments to protect the health and safety of their
citizens.

Instead, the case involves the efforts of Ohio to

collect money from an individual debtor and Ohio's attempt to
cloud its efforts to enforce a money judgment by the facade of
arguing that it is attempting only to require the assistance of
the debtor in cleaning up the Chem-Dyne facilities.

The only type

of performance the State sought from resp was payment of money.
Petr has been unable to point to any other decision in
conflict with the decision of the CA6.

Further, petr has not

shown that anything about the decision below requires intervention

'

'

':1

- ---

of this Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers.
4.

DISCUSSION:

'

Resp makes a strong argument that the case

is moot since the dumpsite has now been cleaned.

It is not clear,

however, from either resp's representations or the affidavit,
exactly how the cleanup of the dumpsite was financed.

If the

State paid for the cleanup, it may attempt to seek reimbursement
from resp.

A continuning controversy over reimbursement may not

e enough to save the present suit from mootness, for whatever
cause of action the State may have may not be grounded on the
state-court order appointing a receiver, which is the order at the
heart of this litigation. 5
Petr has not responded to resp's allegation of mootness.

~recommend
~s.

that the Court

~1

for a reply on the

I

is~of

If resp is correct that the case is moot, then the

decision of the CA6 should be vacated and remanded with
instructions to vacate the DC and Bankruptcy Court judgments.
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 u.s. 36 (1950).

-

If it is not moot, the issue raised by petrs appears to be an
important one with potentially far-reaching effects.

Although

there is no square conflict, the issue is so significant that I
think it merits this Court's attention.

In the cert petition in

Kovacs I, resp noted that several lower courts had followed the

r/

5since the State conceded in Kovacs I that the $75,000
payment provided for in the state-court order was a money
judgment, I am assuming that the State is not contesting the
dischargeability of that liability. Therefore, resp's payment or
nonpayment of that liability is irrelevant to whether or not
there is still a live controversy here.

.,>,

lead of the CAG.

Because environmental cleanup efforts could be

severely hampered if polluters were allowed to evade their courtordered responsibilities, I recommend a GRANT if the case is not
moot.
5.
mootness.

RECOMMENDATION:

I suggest calling for a reply on

If the case is moot, the Court should issue a

the case is not moot, I recommend

~~

two amicus briefs have been filed ..

/
Februa·ry 8, 1984

Durand

Opn in petn

.,

'·
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~~~ February

29, 1984

RE: Ohio v. Kovacs No. 83-1020

TO: Justice Powell
FROM: Cammie

The

reply

brief on

the

mootness

issue

is

in

and

state makes a convincing argument that the case is not moot.
state

court

injunction

ordered Kovacs

the
The

to conduct a cleanup to

remove all the waste material in the soil and groundwater around
the site.

Kovacs never complied with the injunction.

----------------

the state has removed
the surface of the
over,

because

reply

brief

the hazardous and

site,

Kovacs

professes

industrial wastes from

the underground wastes remain.

v.iolated

a

court-ordered

-----------------------------a

Although

desire

to

do

so,

but

More-

injunction,

--

the

the

bankruptcy

court's statutory stay and determination of dischargeability prevent this action.

Thus, there are

~wo

live

challenge to the bankruptcy court's order:

iss~n

the state's

(1) Kovacs' duty under

the state court injunction to abate the continuing water pollution by

removing

site: and

(2)

the waste material

that still

remains on

the

Kovacs' liability for his contempuous disregard of

the state court's injunction.
Because the issue is not moot and is important, I recommend a GRANT.
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No. 83-1020, State of Ohio v. Kovacs
Memorandum to File

This is a summary memo on the basis of a preliminary
reading of the briefs.
The only question presented is whether an injunction
issued by a state court requiring appellee Kovacs to clean
up a hazardous waste storage site is a "debt" or "claim"
under §523 of the Bankruptcy Act that is dischargeable in
Kovacs' Title 11 bankruptcy?
This case was here before on the question whether,
in this same bankruptcy proceeding, the state order to clean
up the waste was exempt from the "automatic stay provision"
of §362 of the Act?

Both the DC and CA 6 held that the state

order was not exempt.

Ohio appealed the case to our Court.

We vacated the judgment and remanded to determine whether
a discharge order had made the case moot.

On remand, the

case was found not to be moot.
The

i ~now

before us is whether Kovacs' identical

obligation under the state court judgment is nondischargeable.
The Bankruptcy Court and CA 6 held that the state order is a
"claim" within the meaning of that term in §523.
it is dischargeable.

'

.

Therefore,

No. 83-1020, State of Ohio v. Kovacs

2.

The DC held that the "law of the case", established in
Kovacs I, doctrine applied.

The question of discharge was

viewed as identical with the question of an automatic stay.
CA 6, however, held that the "law of the case" doctrine was
inapplicable since we had vacated the prior judgment.

CA 6

noted that Kovacs "cannot personally clean up the waste
he wrongfully released into Ohio waters ... except by
paying money or transferring over his own financial
resources."

It observed that the State of Ohio "acknowledged

this by its steadfast pursuit of payment as an alternative
to personal performance."

Accordingly, the state order

was found to be a "claim" and therefore dischargeable.

* * *
Perhaps we should have summarily affirmed CA 6 rather than
Noting this appeal.

I do not find the briefs of either of the

parties particularly well written.

The brief on behalf of the

State of Ohio argues that the state court injunction order to
clean up the waste was entered pursuant to a compromise settlement entered in the state court receivership that preceded the
bankruptcy.

Such an order, Ohio argues, was an equitable

remedy to abate an environmental contamination.

Any expenditure

of money made by Kovacs to comply with the order was simply
a means of compliance with an equitable obligation rather
than paying of a claim or a debt .

...

No. 83-1020, State of Ohio v. Kovacs

3.

The brief of appellee injects a new factual situation
into the case.

It states that:

"As of December 22, 1983 the total surface
cleanup of the facility was completed, and
no chemical, container, or other items
holding chemicals or other wastes remain
on the site."
The brief states that the cost of the cleanup was
paid from funds of the United States Corps of Engineers
under a "superfund" established for the purpose.

The

brief also states that "part or all of this cost was
recouped by the United States through settlements obtained
from toxic waste generating companies named as defendants
in another lawsuit."

Br. p. 5.

Accordingly, as the third point in its brief (see
III), appellee argues that the obligation of Kovacs to
remove the toxic waste "has been performed and this case
is, therefore, moot".

It is further stated that "any claim

for indemnity belongs to the United States - not to the
State of Ohio.
Curiously, this argument of mootness is advanced as
only the third argument on behalf of appellee.

His princi-

pal argument continues to be that the claim was equitable,
and therefore not a debt or a claim.

* * *

No. 83-1020, State of Ohio v. Kovacs

If we have to decide the bankruptcy question, I am
inclined to go along with the analysis of the courts below.
I do not want a full bench memo or even a long bobtail bench
memo.

In view of the possible mootness, the case now may

not present a justiciable issue.
seems to have diminished.

Its importance certainly

I would like my clerk's view as

to the legal question whether an equitable claim of the kind
that can be discharged only by the payment of money, is a
dischargeable claim - as the court below held.

L.F.P.

4.

dro 10/04/84
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MEMORANDUM

To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From: Dan
Re:

Ohio v. Kovacs, No. 83-1020.

This
clean

up

is

toxic

the

case concerning whether

wastes

is

dischargeable

in

a

the

merits

whether

all

formed.

to

It

is

bankruptcy.

scheduled for oral argument on Wednesday, Oct.
of Ohio has

state order

lOth.

The State

just submitted a reply brief which does not affect
but does possibly affect
that

the

the mootness

state court order

issue;

commands has been per-

----------·----..,___-----

Kovacs contends that the case is moot because the
government,

as part of a

i.e.,
~

u.s.

Superfund clean-up operation, has re-

moved all the wastes covered by the order.

Until now, the State

had claimed that the order covered not only surface wastes, which
the

Superfund

which

operation

it did not.

As

on : : :acs ' ;

p~ty

but

also

subsurface

I pointed out in my memo,

argument is unpersuasive.
changed its argument.

removed,

wastes,

however,

this

Now for the first time the State has

-""

It now argues that the subsurface wastes

o
:
---- -;;;=;:::-

are actually wastes that were stored

; e

~

page 2;

surface
.,. 1

until

c;;a..

After

after

the

....,

this

Ohio court

...............

point,

the

--

...

~

State cla1ms,

.

issued
...

its clean-up order •
.,

Kovacs

-

dumped

7\

the

----

sur face
-

chemicals into the ground in a cynical attempt to comply with the
,.,-- '

'"'----"

..__

'"-------

~

court~ s removal directive.
If Ohio is right,

the order has probably not been com-

plied with, and the case is probably not moot.

One must wonder,

though, why Ohio has waited until now to make this argument if it
is indeed true.

In any event, the issue is definitely worth pur-

suing at oral argument.

If Kovacs agrees that he dumped wastes

covered by the order into the ground after the order issued, then
the Court should probably proceed to the merits.

If he does not

agree, the Court should try to find out what happened, perh ap s by
remanding to the CA6 for consideration of mootness.

I~
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
No. 83-1020
Ohio v. Kovacs
Dan

August 24, 1984

Question Presented

Whether a state court judgment entry requiring resp to
clean up certain toxic wastes is a
able in bankruptcy.

"debt" or "claim" discharge-

I. Background
A. Statutory Background.
With certain exceptions

not at

issue here,

the Bank-

ruptcy Code discharges a debtor from "all debts that arose before
the date of

the order

for

relief

.. . ,

and any liability on a

claim ••• as if such claim had arisen before the commencement of
the

case

u.s.c.

11

II

§727 (b)

(emphasis added).

The Code

defines "claim" and "debt" as follows:
"In this title--

* * *

(4) "claim" means--

(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
, (B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of perform-]~~
ance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment,
~ ~
whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is
reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured;

* * *
(11) "debt" means liability on a claim
§101 (4), (11).
This case concerns

the proper

II

11

u.s.c.

interpretation of the underlined

language in §101 ( 4) (B) .

B. Facts and Decisions Below.
Resp
In

Ohio.
Dept.

of

operated a

1976,
Natural

the

Ohio

Resources

hazardous waste disposal
Environmental

Protection

facility
Agency

instituted pollution proceedings

in
and
in

state court against him and others.

Resp settled this suit by

signing

entry

a

stipulation

and

judgment

which,

among

other

..

..

things, ordered him to stop causing water and air pollution and
to remove certain wastes from the premises.

By Feb. 1980, resp

had fallen behind the clean-up schedule and the state court appointed a receiver to do the job.

V"

In July 1980, resp filed a Chapter 11 petn for personal

v

bankruptcy, which the BC converted to Chapter 7 in Sept. 1980.
Later, the State asked a state court to determine resp's current
employment status and
state proceedings.

income.

Resp moved the BC to stay these

The BC, believing the state court motion to

be only a preliminary to a request for the state court to apply
resp's income to the clean-up, stayed the state court proceedings
under the Code's automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. §362.

TheriA)~

DC and CA6 upheld the stay, but on Jan. 24, 1983 this Court vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness.

The Court ap- •. ~

~hu-_··

parently believed that the DC and CA6 decisions in a later
present}

case might have mooted the stay controversy.

--------------

(the

The CA6

appears to be waiting for this Court to decide the present case
before hearing the stay remand.
IL

11

The present case arose when the State asked the BC to
hold several of resp's obligations under the judgment entry--in
particular,

his

duty

to

stop

polluting

premises--to be nondischargeable.
obligations

were

dischargeable

Following the BC,

to

clean

up

the

The BC held, however, that the

as

per form them only by paying money.
affirmed.

and

"claims"

because

On appeal,

resp could

the DC and CA6

the CA6 reasoned that these obliga-

tions amounted to a money judgment, which everyone agrees is dischargeable in bankruptcy.

~~

It explained its decision as follows:

"Ohio is essentially seeking to obtain a money payment
from Kovacs. The impact of its attempt to realize upon
Kovac's income or property cannot be concealed by legerdemain or linguistic gymnastics. Kovacs cannot personally clean up the waste he wrongfully released into
Ohio waters. He cannot perform the affirmative obligations properly imposed upon him by the State court except by paying money or transferring over his own financial resources." Ohio v. Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984, 988
(CA6 1983), cert. granted, 104 s.ct. 1438 (1984).
This Court granted cert and the United States and approximately
thirty states have filed or joined amicus briefs arguing for reversa!.

II. Discussion
A. Mootness.
Resp contends now, as he did in his cert petn, that the
case

The federal

is moot.

"Superfund" program,

he claims,

re-

moved all the wastes covered by the judgment entry before cert
was even filed.

Any action against him now, he believes, belongs

to the United States or to the clients of his who contributed to
the "Superfund" clean-up costs, not to the State of Ohio.

These

others are not parties in this case.
The State answers that the case is still live for three
reasons:

( i)

because

surface wastes,
the surface,

leaving

(ii)

the

"Superfund"

program cleaned

resp still responsible for

up only

those below

because resp is still "causing pollution"

in

violation of the judgment entry, and (iii) because the state cannot seek criminal contempt against resp as long as the BC decision remains in effect.
All three reasons appear invalid.

Although the CA6 has

twice characterized the judgment entry as requiring the clean-up

of "all" wastes at the dump site,
681 F. 2d 454,

454

{CA6 1982)

Id.,

at 985; Ohio v.

Kovacs,

{per curiam) , vacated and remanded

for consideration of mootness,

103 s.ct.

to have misconstrued the entry.

810 {1983), it appears

The judgment entry does not ac-~---~-~

tually appear to require the clean-up of subsurface wastes.

The

relevant order, Order 3, requires resp "to remove and dispose of
all industrial wastes and/or other wastes as described in Finding
No. Seven {7)

...• "

App. to Pet. for Cert. A-46.

Finding No. 7,

in turn, states:
"{7)The Defendants currently estimate that
they have the following amounts of industrial wastes
and/or
other
wastes
stored
at
their
facilities
••• :850,000 gallons in liquid form and 4,000 barrels of
solid or semisolid sludges."
Id., at A-45 {emphasis
added).
-This

language describes only

that

have

leached

into

the

"stored" wastes,
soil.

These

not contaminants

dispersed

subsurface

wastes can hardly be said to be "stored" in the ordinary sense of
the word.

Furthermore, the description of the amount and type of

waste further argues against the State's view.

It would be odd

indeed to characterize dispersed wastes in the subsoil as "gallons"

of

short,

liquid

the

or

"barrels"

"Superfund"

of

solid

clean-up appears

matter

or

sludge.

to have done

all

In
that

Order 3 requires of resp.
Resp also appears not to be "causing pollution" in violation of the judgment entry.

Order 1 states:

"{1) The Defendants and their employees and
agents are permanently enjoined and restrained from
causing 'pollution,' as that term is defined in Section
6111.0l{A) of the Revised Code, of 'waters of the
state,' as that term is defined in Section 6111.0l{H)
of the Revised Code." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-46.

Although

the

~

wastes improperly,

admits

that

resp

is

no longer disposing of

it argues that resp "causes pollution" within

the terms of the order whenever

it rains and wastes previously

dumped into the ground seep into the water table.
There are two difficulties with this argument.

First,

the BC held that "it is clear that the negative injunctions, to
refrain from causing water pollution etc.

•

•

•

I

are mooted since

defendant is not in possession of the premises, since a receiver
has been installed there."
appeal this finding at

~

Id.,

at A-20.

The State failed to

level below and does not really argue

against it now.
Second,

the

State

reads

Order

1

quite

expansively.

Under the State's view, a violation occurs not only when someone
actually

dumps

waste,

but

also

everytime

abandoned wastes seep into the water system.

it

rains

and

long-

It seems more natu-

ral, however, to assume that "causing" refers to the actual dumping of wastes, not to the leaching of them from the soil into the
water

system.

resp's control.

The

leaching,

but

not

the

dumping,

beyond

Furthermore, the State's interpretation of these

terms does not comport satisfactorily with Ohio law.
Code Ann.

is

§6111. 04 states:

Ohio Rev.

"No person shall cause pollution or

place or cause to be placed any sewage, industrial waste, or other wastes in a location where they cause pollution of any waters
of

the

state

"

This section distinguishes between causing

pollution and placing wastes
cause pollution.

in a

location where

they

in turn

If this distinction has any meaning, it must be

that acts, like resp's, of dumping wastes into the ground where

t.:

they can later seep into the water
waste[s]

in

a

location

"caus[ing] pollution" itself.

where

table constitute "plac [ ing]
they

cause

not

Also, the State's broad interpre-

tation could create potentially unlimited
law.

pollution,"

liability under

Ohio

Section 6111.07 makes "each day of violation •.. a separate

offense" which §6111.09 makes punishable by a "civil penalty of
not more than ten thousand dollars."
pose

the

water

penalty

table,

each

day waste

The State's view would im-

seeps

not only each day waste

from

the

is dumped

soil

into the

into the soil.

Although thorough investigation of any legislative history might
indicate otherwise,

common sense

suggests that the penalty was

not meant to work this way.
As a third reason why the case presents a live controversy,

the State simply asserts

that

the

BC order prevents it

from seeking criminal contempt sanctions against resp.

I do not

understand, however, how the order ties the State's hands.
BC decision merely held
dischargeable.
proceedings. 1

the

The

judgment entry's obligations to be

It did not stay any present or future state court
It is unclear, moreover, what the State would base

criminal contempt on.

Resp appears to be violating no order at

this time.

1 The BC's earlier decision did, of course, stay state court
proceedings, but those state court proceedings concerned the collection of money from resp, not criminal contempt. The Bankruptcy Code's stay provision, moreover, specifically prohibits stays
"of the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor." 11 u.s.c. §362.

'

..

...'

B. Merits.
Both sides agree that the only question is whether the
judgment entry gives the State a
for

breach of performance

payment •..• "

11

u.s.c.

"right to an equitable remedy

[that]

§101(4) (B).

gives rise

to a

If it does, the obligation

it creates is dischargeable; otherwise it is not.
answer

is

not

dischar eable

because

it

Although the
think that the JJ~

is certainly not clear-cut, on balance I

obligation

right to

involves

neither

a

"breach of performance" nor
a "right to payment."
___.,~

The State and resp offer two different interpretations
of the "breach of performance" language of §101 (4) (B).
reads the statute as

--

The~ 5~?

implicitly distinguishing between breaches

of "performance" and breaches of "legal duty."

~~~L..4y

In its view, the

-

only , equitable remedies that the statute makes dischargeable are
It

those

for

\\

breaches of contractual obligations,

tions otherwise imposed by law.
the statute as

not for obliga-

Resp, on the other hand, reads

implicitly distinguishing between obligations to

act and those not to act.

The former, he believes, whether con-

tractually or otherwise created, give rise to breach of performance, while the latter do not.

In the context of this particular

case, his distinction boils down to the traditional distinction
--------~-----~------

between mandatory and prohibitory orders.

He would find the for-

mer, but not the latter, dischargeable.
Of these two interpretations,
persuasive.

For

--------

--

one

thing,

the

use of

I

find the State's more
the word

l L

'"

"performance"

along with "breach" follows traditional contract usage.

For an-~

other thing, there is support elsewhere in the Code for believing

~

~

~-

.,

that

Congress

523 (a) (7),

viewed

statutory

duties

Section

differently.

for example, exempts from discharge any debt "to the

extent such a debt is a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to
and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation

for

actual pecuniary loss other

than a

Id.

For another, the -distinction
between
mandatory
and prohibi- - -·----._.
...,..__._
__.....
......_

tory

injunctions

somewhat

slippery

•••• "

_ ________

-----

is

tax penalty

and

formalistic.

It

is

nearly always possible to view either type of order in terms of

~

the other by, for example, wording a command not to act in a certain way as a positive command to act differently.

--------

Furthermore,

I can find no support--policy or otherwise--for this distinction
in

the

Code.

For

purposes

of

bankruptcy,

the

"style"

of

the

order appears irrelevant. 2
The

judgment entry

requirement of §101 ( 4) (B)
ment."

added).

the

second ~

that it "give rise to a right to

;)~~

pay~

,

In the original House bill, the term "claim"

&.-

'~/..,/-

"right to an equitable remedy for breach of perform- .La

such
H. R.

II

satisfy

~

included a
if

not

The legislative history, while not absolutely conclusive, ~A..:/

supports this view.

ance

also does

breach does
8200,

not give

95th Cong. ,

rise

to a

1st Sess., p.

right
3

( 1977)

to

payment~

(emphasis

The committee report noted how broad a definition this

was:

2 Resp also argues that even if the Court believes the term
"breach of performance" refers only to contractual duties, there
was such a breach in this case.
He rests this remarkable argument on the belief that the judgment entry is nothing but a private contract. The fact that both parties agreed to the judgment
entry, however, makes it no less an order of the court.

.
•.

~, ·~·

l'

"The definition also includes as a claim an equitable
right to performance that does not give rise to a right
to payment.
By this broadest possible definition .•• ,
the bill contemplates that all legal obligations of the
debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be
able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case.
It permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy
court." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong. , 1st Sess.,
p. 309 (1977).

__

The
tion.

Its

Senate,
.____
bill,

however,

in fact,

recoiled

deleted

all

from so broad a definireferences

to equitable

remedies from the definition of "claim" and restricted that term
exclusively to rights to payment.
When
House

sponsor,

the

House

then

Representative

considered
Edwards,

enacted language as a compromise.

the

Senate

proposed

the

bill,

the

eventually

He explained the compromise as

follows:
Section 101 (4) (B) represents a modification
of the House-passed bill to include [in] the definition
of 'claim' a right to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to
payment. This is intended to cause the liquidation, or
estimation of contingent rights of payment for which
there may be an alternative equitable remedy with the
result that the equitable remedy will be susceptible to
being discharged in bankruptcy.
For example, in some
states a judgment for specific performance may be sat- 1
isf'ed b an alternative right to payment, in Efie event t
that performance 1s re use : 1n
a e ent the creditor
entitled to performance would have a 'claim' for purposes of a proceeding under title 11.
On the other hand, rights to an equitable remedy for breach of performance with respect to which such
breach does not give rise to a right to payment are not
'claims' and would therefore not be susceptible to discharge in bankruptcy."
124 Cong. Rec. 32350, 32393
(1978) (emphasis added).
The Senate later accepted the House definition.
These statements, particulary the last, all suggest that

---

Congress

-~- --,

intended to discharge

there was an alternative right

equitable obligations only when
to damages.

Of course, as petr

points out, Representative Edwards's statement does not actually
say that the House definition was intended to provide for liquidation

of

equitable

remedies

only when

an

alternative

damages

remedy exists, but this does seem the most reasonable conclusion.
Such a view,

in effect,

forces

the election between alternative

remedies that is dischargeable.
Resp argues, however, that the language "gives rise to a
right to payment" covers more than just situtations in which an
alternative damages remedy exists.

In his view, an obligation is

dischargeable so long as it requires

~

kind of payment.

argues this position along two different lines.
that

any

injunction

requiring

an

small--"gives rise to payment."

First, he claims

expenditure--no

An

matter

how

This, however, proves too much.

As the CA3 noted recently in a very similar case:
erything costs something.

Resp

"[A]lmost ev-

injunction which does not compel

some expenditure or loss of monies may often be an effective nullity."

Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dept. of Environmental Resources, 733

F.2d 267, 278 (CA3 1984).

The only virtue of this interpretation

is its consistency with resp's earlier interpretation of "breach
of performance."

Since it costs money to do almost anything and

only doing nothing can possibly be said to be costless, resp is
again putting forward the distinction between mandatory and prohibitory orders.
istic.
doing

But again, this distinction is largely formal-

Prohibitory
one

thing

orders

are

often requires

rarely

costless:

spending money

stopping

from

to do something

else. 3

Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages.

Resp also argues that the presence of a receiver necessarily means that any breach of performance gives rise to a right
to payment.
cl~ning

His point is that his obligation now consists not of

up

t~e Eremi~s,

to clean them up.

but only of havin

the receiver

Breach of this new obligation, he believes,

can give rise only to a right to payment.
Even if resp is technically correct, it seems odd that
the receiver

should make any difference.

After

all,

the state

court appointed him only because it found that resp had acted in
"flagrant
App.

disregard

to Pet.

of

the

Stipulation

for Cert. A-54.

and

Judgment

Decree."

His appointment merely bifurcated

----

resp's existing duty.

Although resp's primary duty was to clean

up the premises, there was of course the underlying duty to spend

-

the money necessary
duty

without

to do so.

fulfilling

He could not fulfill

the other.

The

receiver's

the

first

appointment

merely placed the duty to clean up in the receiver while leaving
the duty to pay in the resp.

It did not create any new duties or

change the nature of those that already existed.

In this view,

the appointment of a receiver makes at most a technical difference

in the nature of

the duty

involved.

Furthermore,

holding

that this technical difference makes the obligation dischargeable
would have the unfortunate effect of encouraging parties to de-

3 Resp admits that a small class of mandatory orders violate
this distinction.
These orders, commands to act that the individual can perform by himself without spending money, are so
rare, he argues, that they can be safely ignored.
In any case,
he adds, his obligation does not fall into this category.

~

.

fault
when

on
a

If an obligation is dischargeable

their obligations.

receiver

is appointed but

not otherwise,

obligors will

have every incentive not to perform their duties and to act in
bad faith.

III. Summary.
Since the Superfund program has already cleaned up all
the

wastes

apparently covered

likely moot.

by

the

order,

the

case

is

most

Any cause of action against resp for the clean-up

lies with the United States or the firms that helped pay for it,
not with the State.
On
entry

is

the merits,

not

the obligation imposed by the

requirements for a "claim."
does

not

It meets

dischargeable.

constitute

breach of legal duty.
a right to payment."
not conclusively)

a

neither

of

judgment

§101 ( 4) (B) 's

First, resp's failure to observe it

"breach

of

performance,"

but

rather

a

Second, the breach does not "give rise to
The legislative history indicates (although

that the breach must give rise to an alterna-

tive right to payment.

It is not enough that the remedy requires

spending money.

IV. Recommendation.
I would find

the case moot and vacate and remand with

instructions for

the CA6 to vacate the decisions below it.

United States v.

Munsingwear,

--------·

340

u.s.

36

(1950).

See

I would not

recommend that the Court simply vacate and remand for consideration of mootness,

for two separate panels of the CA6 have al-

ready misconstrued the critical provision of the judgment entry.
In each case,
wastes

even

they have simply assumed
though

the

order

itself

that
speaks

it applies
of

only

to all
"stored"

wastes.
If the Court wants to reach the merits, I would reverse
the CA6.

The statutory language and policy and the legislative

history all suggest that Congress did not intend for obligations
like

this

one

to be dischargeable

in bankruptcy.

Furthermore,

resp has not made an adequate showing that Congress intended to
preempt the traditional state police powers involved here.

This

type of preemption should not be lightly inferred.
Of the two possible grounds of reversal--that the obli-

- -------·-----------·-------

~

gation does

not

involve a

"breach of performance"

and

that it

does , not "give[] rise to a right to payment"-- I would recommend
-------------------~--·-~----

reversing on the second.

The presence of legislative history on

this second question provides firmer support for reversal.

, •.
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MEMORANDUM

~

JUSTICE POWELL

~

..r~-~
..

F-f ~

~~-~/

From: Dan
Re:

/J

c~~......u~~~

~
To:

~

l'l-0

Mootness of Ohio v. Kovacs, No. 83-1020.

Resp contends now, as he did in his cert petn, that the
case is moot because the federal "Superfund" program has removed
all the wastes covered by the judgment entry.

Any action against

him now, he believes, belongs to the United States or to the elients of his who contributed to the
not to the State of Ohio.

"Superfund" clean-up costs,

These others are not parties in this

case.
Until
the

case

was

it filed
still

its reply brief,

live

for

three

the State argued that

reasons:

( i)

because

the

"Superfund" program cleaned up only surface wastes, leaving resp
still responsible for those below the surface,

( i i) because resp

is still "causing pollution" in violation of the judgment entry,
and (iii) because the state cannot seek criminal contempt against
resp as long as the BC decision remains in effect.
brief,
claimed

the State added another
that

resp

I \

dumped

some

reason.
of

the

In its reply

For the first time,
surface

\

wastes

into

it
the

,..,

.,

t.•

ground after he agreed to the judgment entry.

Interestingly, the

State did not even mention this at oral argument.
If resp did not dump surface wastes into the soil after
he

agreed

to

the

mootness appear

entry,

all

invalid.

of

the

State 1 s

arguments

against

Although the CA6 has twice character-

ized the judgment entry as requiring the clean-up of "all" wastes
at the dump site, Id., at 985; Ohio v. Kovacs, 681 F.2d 454, 454
(CA6 1982)

(per curiam) ,

vacated and remanded for consideration

of mootness on other grounds, 103 s.ct. 810 (1983), it appears to
have misconstrued the entry.

The judgment entry does not actual-------------~-----

ly appear to require the clean-up of subsurface wastes.

~ ~

The rel-

evant order, Order 3, requires resp "to remove and dispose of all
industrial wastes and/or other wastes as described in Finding No.
Seven (7)

"

App. to Pet. for Cert. A-46.

Finding No. 7, in

turn, states:
"(7)The Defendants currently estimate that
they have the following amounts of industrial wastes
and/or
other
wastes
stored
at
their
facilities
••• :850,000 gallons in liquid form and 4,000 barrels of
solid or semisolid sludges."
Id., at A-45 (emphasis
added).
--This

language describes only

"stored"

that

have

soil.

leached

into

the

wastes,

These

not contaminants

dispersed

subsurface

wastes can hardly be said to be "stored" in the ordinary sense of
the word.

Furthermore, the description of the amount and type of

waste further argues against the State 1 s view.

It would be odd

indeed to characterize dispersed wastes in the subsoil as "gallons"

of

short,

liquid

the

or

"barrels"

"Superfund"

of

solid

clean-up appears

matter

or

sludge.

to have done

In

all

that

dump

the

"'~"\-"-

Order

3

requires

of

resp--assuming
-~

that

he

did

not

stored wastes into the soil after he agreed to the judgment entry.

If he did, he would probably still be in continuing viola-

tion of Order 3 and the case would not be moot.
Resp also appears not to be "causing pollution" in violation of the judgment entry.

Order 1 states:

"(1) The Defendants and their employees and
agents are permanently enjoined and restrained from
causing 'pollution,' as that term is defined in Section
6lll.Ol(A) of the Revised Code, of 'waters of the
state, ' as that term is defined in Section 6111.01 (H)
of the Revised Code." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-46.
Although

the

State admits

wastes improperly,

that

resp

is

no

longer disposing of

it argues that resp "causes pollution" within

the terms of the order whenever

it rains and wastes previously

dumped into the ground seep into the water table.
There are

two difficulties with this argument.

First,

the BC held that "it is clear that the negative injunctions, to
refrain from causing water pollution etc.

... '

are mooted since

defendant is not in possession of the premises, since a receiver
has been installed there."
appeal this finding at

~

Id.,

at A-20.

The State failed to

level below and does not really argue

against it now.
Second,

the

State

reads

Order

1

quite

expansively.

Under the State's view, a violation occurs not only when someone
actually

dumps

waste,

but

also

everytime

abandoned wastes seep into the water system.

it

rains

and

long-

It seems more natu-

ral, however, to assume that "causing" refers to the actual dumping of wastes, not to the leaching of them from the soil into the
water

system.

resp's control.

The

leaching,

but

not

the

dumping,

is

beyond

Furthermore, the State's interpretation of these

.'•,
'·J.

.,, '
....

terms does not comport satisfactorily with Ohio law.
Code Ann.

§6111.04 states:

Ohio Rev.

"No person shall cause pollution or

place or cause to be placed any sewage, industrial waste, or other wastes in a location where they cause pollution of any waters
of

the

state

"

This section distinguishes between causing

pollution and placing wastes
cause pollution.
that acts,

in a

location where

If this distinction has any meaning, it must be

like resp's, of dumping wastes into the ground where

they can later seep into the water
waste[s]

in

a

location

"caus[ing] pollution" itself.

where

table constitute
they

cause

"plac [ ing]

pollution,"

not

Also, the State's broad interpre-

tation could create potentially unlimited
law.

they in turn

liability under

Ohio

Section 6111.07 makes "each day of violation ••• a separate

offense" which §6111.09 makes punishable by a "civil penalty of
not more than ten thousand dollars."
pose

the

water

penalty each

table,

day

waste

The State's view would im-

seeps

not only each day waste

from

the

is dumped

soil

into the

into the soil.

Although thorough investigation of any legislative history might
indicate otherwise,

common sense suggests that the penalty was

not meant to work this way.
As a final reason why the case presents a live controversy,

the

State simply asserts

that

the

BC order prevents it

from seeking criminal contempt sanctions against resp.
understand, however,

how the order ties the State's hands.

BC decision merely held the
dischargeable.
proceedings.

I do not
The

judgment entry's obligations to be

It did not stay any present or future state court
The

Bankruptcy

Code's

. '

stay

provision,

moreover,

specifically prohibits stays "of the commencement or continuation
of

a

criminal

u.s.c.

§362.

it

unclear

is

action

or

proceeding

against

the

debtor."

11

And even if the BC could stay contempt proceedings,
what

the

State would base crimina! contempt on.

Resp appears to be violating no order at this time.
I would recommend vacating the judgment of the CA6 for
consideration of mootness and allowing it in turn to remand the
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OHIO v. WILLIAM EE KOVACS, DBA B & W
ENTERPRISES, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[December - , 1984]

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pe_!illQper State of Ohio obtained ~ injunction ordering
respondent William Kovacs to clean up a hazardous waste
site.
receiver-wa8Subsequently appointed. Still later,
Kovacs filed a petition for bankruptcy. The question before us is whether, in the circumstances present here,
Kovacs' obligation under the injunction is a "debt" or "liability on a claim" subject to discharge under the bankruptcy
code.
I

Kovacs was the chief executive officer and ::;tockholder of
Chem-Dyne Corporation, which with other business entities
operated an industrial and hazardous waste disposal site in
Hamilton, Ohio. In 1976, the State sued Kovacs and the
business entities in state court for polluting public waters,
maintaining a nuisance, and causing fish kills, all in violation
of state environmental laws. In 1979, both in his individual
capacity and on behalf of Chem-Dyne, Kovacs signed a stipulation and judgment entry settling the lawsuit. Among
other things, the stipulation enjoined the defendants from
causing further pollution of : he air or public waters. forbade
bringing additional industrial wastes onto the site. required
the defendants to.remove specified wastes fro m the pronerty,
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and ordered the payment of $75,000 to compensate the State
for injury to wildlife.
Kovacs and the other defendants failed to comply with
their obligations under the injunction. The State then obtained the appointment in state court of a receiver, who was
directed to take possession of all property and other assets of
Kovacs and the corporate defendants and to implement the
judgment entry by cleaning up the Chem-Dyne site. Thereceiver took possession of the site but had not completed his
tasks when Kovacs filed a personal bankruptcy petition. 1
Seeking to develop a basis for requiring part of Kovacs'
post-bankruptcy income to be applied to the unfinished task
of the receivership, the State then filed a motion in state
court to discover Kovacs' current income and assets.
Kovacs requested that the bankruptcy court stay those proceedings, which it did. 2 The State also filed a complaint in
the bankruptcy court seeking a declaration that Kovacs'
obligation under the stipulation and judgment order to clean
up the Chem-Dyne site was not dischargeable in bankruptcy
Kovacs originally filed a reorganization petition under chapter 11 of the
bankruptcy code, 11 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. , (1982) but converted the petition to a liquidation bankruptcy under chapter 7. See 11 U. S. C. § 1112
(1982).
2
The bankruptcy court held that the requested hearing was an effort to
collect money from Kovacs in violation of the automatic stay provision.
See 11 U. S. C. § 362. It entered a specific stay as well. The District
Court affirmed, ruling that Ohio was trying to enforce a judgment obtained
before filing of the bankruptcy petition. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit also found the hearing barred. In re Kovacs, 681 F. 2d 454
(1982). In that court's view, while § 362(b) allowed governmental units to
continue to enforce police powers through mandatory injunctions, it denied
them the power to collect money in their enforcement eiforts. Because of
the later filing by Ohio of a complaint to declare that Kovacs' obligations
were not claims under bankruptcy, we granted certiorari, vacated the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded to that court to consider
whether the dispute over the stay was moot. - - U. S. - ; 103 S. Ct.
810 (1983). As far as we are advised, the Court of Appeals has taken no
action on the remand.
1
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because it was not a "debt,"-a liability on a "claim," within
the meaning of the bankruptcy code. In addition, the complaint sought an injunction against the bankruptcy trustee to
restrain him from pursuing any action to recover assets of
Kovacs in the hands of the receiver. The bankruptcy court
ruled against Ohio, as did the District Court. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Ohio essentially
sought from Kovacs only a monetary payment and that such a
required payment was a liability on a claim that was dischargeable under the bankruptcy statute. We granted cer- )
tiorari to determine the ~rg~abi].ty o!_Kovacs' obligation
under the affirmative injunction entered against him.
II

Kovacs alleges that the Army Corps of Engineers, using
funds recovered from those concerns that generated the
wastes, has removed all industrial wastes from the site and
that if he has an obligation to pay those expenses, the obligation is owed to the United States, not the State. Kovacs
urges that the case is therefore moot. The State argues that
the case is not moot because the removal of the barrels and
wastes from the surface did not satisfy all of Kovacs' obligations to clean up the site; it is said that the ground itself
remains permeated with toxic materials that must be removed if further pollution of the public waters is to be
avoided. We perceive nothing feigned or frivolous about the
State's submission. Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 57
(1968). The State surely has a stake in the outcome of this
case, United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445
U. S. 388, 397 (1980), which in our view is not moot. We
proceed to the merits.
III
Except for the nine kinds of debts saved from discharge by
11 U. S. C. § 523(a), a discharge in bankruptcy discharges
the debtor from all debts that arose before bankruptcy.
§ 727(b). It is not claimed here that Kovacs' obligation under

83-102~0PINION
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the injunction fell within any of the categories of debts excepted from discharge by § 523. Rather, the State submits
that the obligation to clean up the Chem-Dyne site is not a
debt at all within the meaning of the bankruptcy law.
For bankruptcy purposes, a debt is a liability on a claim.
§ 101(11). A claim is defined by § 101(4) as follows:
"(4) 'claim' means(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment,
whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is
reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured;"
The provision at issue here is § 101(4)(B). For the purposes
of that section, there is little doubt that the State had the
right to an equitable remedy under state law and that the
right has been reduced to judgment in the form of an injunction ordering the cleanup. The State argues, however, that
the injunction it has secured is not a claim against Kovacs
for bankruptcy purposes because (1) Kovacs' default was a
breach of the statute, not a breach of an ordinary commercial
contract which concededly would give rise to a claim; and (2)
Kovacs' breach of his obligation under the injunction did not
give rise to a right to payment within the meaning of
§ 101(4)(B). We are not persuaded by either submission.
There is no indication in the language of the statute that
the right to performance cannot be a claim unless it arises
from a contractual arrangement. The State resorted to the
courts to enforce its environmental laws against Kovacs and
secured a negative order to cease polluting~ an affirmative
order to clean up the site and an order to pay a sum of money
to recompense the State for damage done to the fish popula-

83-1020--0PINION
OHIO v. KOVACS

5

tion. Each order was one to remedy an alleged breach of
Ohio law; and if Kovacs' obligation to pay $75,000 to the state
is a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy, which the State freely
concedes, it makes little sense to to assert that because the
clean-up order was entered to remedy a statutory violation,
it cannot likewise constitute a claim for bankruptcy purposes.
Furthermore, it is apparent that Congress desired a broad
definition of a "claim" 3 and knew how to limit the application
of a provision to contracts when it desired to do so. 4 Other
provisions cited by Ohio refute, rather that support, its
strained interpretation. 5
The courts below also found little substance in the submission.that the clean-up obligation did not give rise to a right to
payment that renders the order dischargeable under § 727.
The definition of "claim" in H. R. 8200 as originally drafted
would have deemed a right to an equitable remedy for breach
of performance a claim even if it did not give rise to a right to
payment. 6 The initial Senate definition of claim was narrower/ and a compromis~ version, § 101(4), was finally
adopted. In that version, the key phrases "equitable remedy," "breach of performance," and "right to payment" are
not defined. See 11 U. S. C. § 101. Nor are the differences
3
H. R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977); S. Rep. No. 989,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978). See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, 1!101-.04, at
101-16.2 (15th ed. 1984).
• See 11 U. S. C. § 365 (1982) (assumption or rejection of executory contracts and leases).
6
Congress created exemptions from discharge for claims involving penalties and forfeitures owed to a governmental unit, 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(7),
and for claims involving embezzlement and larceny. I d., § 523(a)(4). If a
bankruptcy debtor has committed larceny or embezzlement, giving rise to
a remedy of either damages or equitable restitution under state law, the
resulting liability for breach of an obligation created by law is clearly a
claim which is non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.
6
H. R. 8200 (House Committee Print), 95th Cong., 1st Sess., (1977), as
reported September 8, 1977, 309-310.
7
See S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., (1977), as introduced October 31,
1977, 299.
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between the successive versions explained. The legislative
history offers only a statement by the sponsors of the Bankruptcy Reform Act with respect to the scope of the provision:
"Section 101(4)(B) . . . is intended to cause the liquidation or estimation of contingent rights of payment for
which there may be an alternative equitable remedy
with the result that the equitable remedy will be susceptible to being discharged in bankruptcy. For example,
in some States, a judgment for specific performance may
be satisfied by an alternative right to payment in the
event performance is refused; in that event, the creditor
entitled to specific performance would have a "claim" for
purposes of a proceeding under title 11." 8
We think the rulings of the courts below were wholly consistent with the statute and its legislative history, sparse as it is.
The Bankruptcy Court ruled as follows, In re Kovacs, 29
Bankr. Rep. 816 (Bankr. SD Ohio 1982):
"There is no suggestion by plaintiff that defendant can
render performance under the affirmative obligation
other than by the payment of money. We therefore
conclude that plaintiff has a claim against defendant
within the meaning of 11 U. S. C. § 101(4), and that defendant owes plaintiff a debt within the meaning of 11
U. S. C. § 101(11). Furthermore, we have concluded
that that debt is dischargeable." 9
8

124 Cong. Rec. H11089 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); see also 124 Cong. Rec. S17406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of
Sen. DeConcini).
9
More fully stated, the Bankruptcy Court's observations were:
"What is at stake in the present motion is whether defendant's bankruptcy will discharge the affirmative obligation imposed upon him by the
Judgment Entry, that he remove and dispose of all industrial and/or other
wastes at the subject premises. If plaintiff is successful here, it would be
able to levy on defendant's wages, the action prevented by our Prior Decision, after defendant's bankruptcy case is closed and/or the stay of 11
U. S. C. § 362 as interpreted by our Prior Decision is no longer in force.
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The District Court affirmed, primarily because it was bound
by and saw no error in the Court of Appeals' prior opinion
holding that the State was seeking no more than a money
judgment as an alternative to requiring Kovacs personally to
perform the obligations imposed by the injunction. To hold
otherwise, the District Court explained, "would subvert Congress' clear intention to give debtors a fresh start." App. to
Pet. for Cert. A-16. The Court of Appeals also affirmed, rejecting the State's insistence that it had no right to, and was
not attempting to enforce, an alternative right to payment:
"Ohio does not suggest that Kovacs is capable of personally cleaning up the environmental damage he may have
caused. Ohio claims there is no alternative right to payment, but when Kovacs failed to perform, state law gave
a state receiver total control over all Kovacs' assets.
Ohio later used state law to try and discover Kovacs'
post-petition income and employment status in an apparent attempt to levy on his future earnings. In reality,
the only type of performance in which Ohio is now interThe parties have crystallized the issue here in simple fashion, plaintiff
stoutly insisting that the just identified affirmative obligation is not a monetary obligation, while defendant says that it is. The problem arises, of
course, because it is not stated as a monetary obligation. Essentially for
this reason plaintiff argues that it is not a monetary obligation. Yet plaintiff in discussing the background for the Judgment Entry says that it expected that defendant would generate sufficient funds in his ongoing business to pay for the clean-up. Moreover, we take judicial notice that
plaintiff sought discovery with respect to defendant's earnings, the matter
dealt with in our Prior Decision, for the purpose of levying upon his wages,
a technique which has no application other than in the enforcement of a
money judgment. There is no suggestion by plaintiff that defendant can
rander performance under the affirmative obligation other than by the payment of money. We therefore conclude that plaintiff has a claim against
defendant within the meaning of 11 U. S. C. § 101(4), and that defendant
owes plaintiff a debt within the meaning of 11 U. S. C. § 101(11). Furthermore, we have concluded that that debt is dischargeable." 29 Bankr.
Rep., at 818.

·.....
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ested is a money payment to effectuate the Chem-Dyne
cleanup."
"The impact of its attempt to realize upon Kovacs' income or property cannot be concealed by legerdemain or
linguistic gymnastics. Kovacs cannot personally clean
up the waste he wrongfully released into Ohio waters.
He cannot perform the affirmative obligations properly
imposed upon him by the State court except by paying
money or transferring over his own financial resources.
The State of Ohio has acknowledged this by its steadfast
pursuit of payment as an alternative to personal performance." 717 F. 2d, at 987-988.
As we understand it, the C~f Appeal~_held that, in the
circumstances, the clean-up duty ha been reduced to a onetary ob~n.
-We do not disturb this jud~ent. The injunction surely
obliged Kovacs to c ean up t e site. But when he failed to do
so, rather than prosecute Kovacs under the environmental
laws or bring civil or criminal contempt proceedings, the
State secured the appointment of a ~eiver, who was ordered to take possession of all of Kovacs' non-exempt assets
as well as the assets of the corporate defendants and to comply with the injunction entered against Kovacs. As wise as
this course may have been, it dis ossessed Kovacs, removed
his authority over the site, and diveste<rllim Of assets that
might have been used by him to clean up the property. Furthermore, when the bankruptcy trustee sought to recover
Kovacs' assets from the receiver, the latter sought an injunction against such action. Although Kovacs had been ordered
to "cooperate" with the receiver, he was disabled by the
receivership from personally taking charge of and carrying
out the removal of wastes from the property. What the receiver wanted from Kovacs after bankruptcy was the money
to defray clean-up costs. At oral argument in this Court, the
State's counsel conceded that after the receiver was ap-
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pointed, the only performance sought from Kovacs was the
payment of m~Tr. --of -"Oral~Ar~. Had
Kovacs urn1shed the necessary funds, either before or after
bankruptcy, there seems little doubt that the receiver and
the State would have been satisfied. On the facts before it,
and with the receiver in control of the site, 10 we cannot fault
the Court of Appeals for concluding that the clean-up order
had been c nverted into <!_n obl~tion to Q_ay money, an obligation that was iSChargeahle in bankruptcy. 11
;,:_____;,
~

---------=~~

'
IV
It is well to emphasize what we have not decided. First,
we do not suggest that Kovacs' discharge will shield him from
prosecution for having violated the environmental laws of
Ohio or for criminal contempt for not performing his obligations under the injunction- prior to bankruptcy. Second, had
a fine or monetary penalty for violation of state law been imposed on Kovacs prior to bankruptcy, § 523(a)(7) forecloses
any suggestion that his obligation to pay the fine or penalty
would be discharged in bankruptcy. Third, we do not adWe were advised at oral argument that the receiver at that time was
still in possession of the site, although he was contemplating terminating
the receivership. Tr. of Oral Argument, 4, 56-57. We were also advised
that it was difficult to tell exactly who owned the property as 500 Ford
Boulevard and that although the trustee did not formally abandon the
property, he did not seek to take possession of it. Tr. 55, 58.
11
The State relies on Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Department of Environmental
Resources, 733 F. 2d 267 (CA3 1984). There, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the automatic stay provision of 11 U. S. C. § 362 did
not apply to the State's seeking an injunction against a bankrupt to require
compliance with the environmental laws. This was held to be an effort to
enforce the police power statutes of the state, not a suit to enforce a money
judgment. But in that case, there had been no appointment of a receiver
who had the duty to comply with the state law and who was seeking money
from the bankrupt. The automatic stay provision does not apply to suits
to enforce the regulatory statutes of the state, but the enforcement of such
a judgment by seeking money from the bankrupt-what the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded was involved in this case-is another
matter.
10

i
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dress what the legal consequences would have been had
Kovacs taken bankruptcy before a receiver had been appointed and a trustee had been designated with the usual duties of a bankruptcy trustee. 12 Fourth, we do not hold that
the injunction against bringing further toxic wastes on the
premises or against any conduct that will contribute to the
pollution of the site or the State's waters is dischargeable in
bankruptcy; we here address, as did the Court of Appeals,
only the affirmative duty to clean up the site and the duty to
Finally, we do not question that
pay money to that end.
anyone in possession of the site-whether it is Kovacs or another in the event the receivership is liquidated and the
12

The commencement of a case under the Bankruptcy Act creates an estate which, with limited exceptions, consists of all of the debtor's property
wherever located. 11 U. S. C. § 541. The trustee, who is to be appointed
promptly in Chapter 7 cases, is charged with the duty of collecting andreducing the property of the estate and is to be accountable for all of such
property. 11 U. S. C. § 704. A custodian of the debtor's property appointed before commencement of the case is required to deliver the debtor's property in his custody to the trustee, unless the bankruptcy court
concludes that the interest of creditors would be better served by permitting the custodian to continue in possession and control of the property.
11 U. S. C. § 543. After notice and hearing, the trustee may abandon any
property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate. 11 U. S. C. § 554. Such abandonment is
to the person having the possessory interest in the property. S. Rep. No.
95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1978). Property that is scheduled but not
administered is deemed abandoned. 11 U. S. C. § 554(c). Had no receiver been appointed prior to Kovacs' bankruptcy, the trustee would have
been charged with the duty of collecting Kovacs' non-exempt property and
administering it. If the site at issue were Kovacs' property, the trustee
would shortly determine whether it was of value to the estate. If the
property was worth more than the costs of bringing it into compliance with
state law, the trustee would undoubtedly sell it for its net value, and the
buyer would clean up the property, in which event whatever obligation
Kovacs might have had to clean up the property would have been satisfied.
If the property were worth less than the cost of cleanup, the trustee would
likely abandon it to its prior owner, who would have to comply with the
state environmental law to the extent of his or its ability.
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trustee abandons the property, or a vendee from the receiver
or the bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmental laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of the
State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions. As
the case comes to us, however, Kovacs has been dispossessed
and the State seeks to enforce his clean-up obligation by a
money judgment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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MEMORANDUM

To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From: Dan
Re:

JUSTICE WHITE'S First Draft of Ohio v. Kovacs, No. 83-1020.

I

see three difficulties with JUSTICE WHITE'S opinion,

but I am not sure that they should keep you from joining.

Fi~

JUSTICE WHITE slides around the serious mootness problem in this
case

by

saying

merely

that

"[w] e

perceive

frivolous about the State's submission."

nothing

feigned

or

This is hardly an an-

swer to Kovacs's argument and the clear language of the judgment
entry that he signed.
merits now,

however,

Given that the Court wants to decide the
I

am not

this point would be a good

sure

idea.

that writing separately on
It would merely point out a

problem that readers would probably otherwise be unaware of and
perhaps complicate mootness doctrine

for

future cases.

On the

~

I disagree with JUSTICE WHITE'S interpretation

of the statute.

The real question posed by the case is whether

Kovacs's failure to clean up the dump site constituted a "breach
of performance .•. giving rise to a right to payment."

As I said

in my bench memo, I believe that legislative history and the lan-

...

..

'·

guage of

the

statute

indicate
~

result.

not~ure

courts'

_opposite of JUSTICE WHITE'S
'

This is a~ittedly a ~lose _~ n, however, and I am

how

~d be~~y

WHITE'S current draft
relevant

the
---

statutory

writing separately.

JUSTIC~

is so vague in its discussion of the two

terms

that

it

might

not

affect

the

lower

interpretation of them in situations outside the narrow

one presented here.
Third, JUSTICE WHITE places much importance on the presence of a }! us~ in this ca ; e.

On the one hand,

limits the case--which is a good

idea considering how messy it

is.

On the other hand,

-

this greatly

giving this distinction any importance

encourages potential bankrupts not to carry out their legal obligations.

If

they

stall,

the

State

will

presumably appoint a

trustee and their obligations will thus be dischargeable later.
This strikes me as bad policy,

but again

I

am not sure it is

worth quarreling over.
These are all close judgment calls which my inexperience
prevents me from making with much confidence.
er,

If pushed, howev-

I would hesitantly recommend joining the opinion.

You might

consider waiting a bit to see if other Justices see some of these
same problems and feel strongly about them.
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elf.
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

December 18, 1984

Re:

83-1020 - Ohio v. Kovacs

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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December 18, 1984

83-1020 Ohio v. Kovacs

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Si.ncerely,

Justice White
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'I'he Conference
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Dear Byron,
Please join me.
Sincerely,
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Justice White
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBE:RS

or

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

December 19, 1984

No. 83-1020

Ohio v. Kovacs

Dear Byron,
Please join me. I will also be circulating a
brief separate concurrence mentioning that in my view state
law would govern the preference, if any, to be given Ohio's
claim.
Sincerely,

Justice White

Copies to the Conference
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No. 83-1020-0hio v. Kovacs

Dear Byron:
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Sincerely,
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T.M.

Justice White
cc:

The Conference
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~
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.JUSTICE WN . .J . BRENNAN, .JR.

December 27, 1984

No. 83-1020
Ohio v. Kovacs

Dear Byron,
I agree.
Sincerely,
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Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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Re:
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Dear Byron,
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